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Assume, for a moment, that all of the State statutes dealing
peculiarly with corporations had, on January x, 19o5, been
repealed.
Assume, also, that there had then been appointed a com-
petent body of men, familiar with the present financial, commer-
cial and social conditions, and with the general common and
statutory law, but wholly unaware of the previous existence of
the mass of "corporation law" so repealed; and that upon this
body of men there had been conferred the power of making a
system of "corporation law" for the United States.
Considering the matter in this light it is highly improbable
that the new corporation law thus produced would be in any way
similar in its general framework to the present so-called "State
system" of incorporation and corporate regulation.
In other words, our present system of corporation law is
explainable only by reference to the history of its growth, not
by reference to present conditions or to any justifiable modern
theory.
I. GENERAL LEGAL THEORY OF CORPORATION LAW.
The legal theory of corporation law can be most accurately
understood by considering such law as consisting of:
(a) A number of peculiar powers granted to individuals
(granted by the legislature and peculiar in the sense that the
same are in derogation of the common law).
(b) Limitations placed upon the exercise of these powers.
(c) Means provided for the enforcement of such limitations.
A concrete illustration will serve to show the application of
the above classification. A given state grants to a body of
individuals the powers of corporate existence and identity,
succession, limited liability, establishment of a representative
form of government, means of voluntary dissolution, etc.
Upon each of these powers there are placed one or more
limitations, as, for instance, a given state limits the power of
corporate existence to fifty years; the power of representative
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government to a specified number of directors elected in a
specified way; the power of voluntary dissolution to a public
and specified form of procedure, with proper guaranties of the
protection of the rights of third persons.
These limitations, again, are enforced by various means,
the most common method being the provision for reports or
returns to be made by the corporation to specified state officials.
Incorporators are by a given state required to show in their cer-
tificate of organization that they have not exceeded the maxi.
mum period of allowed succession or duration; that the pre-
scribed number of directors have been chosen, etc. A criminal
penalty, fine or imprisonment, may be provided for failure of
officers to keep proper books; creditors are given private rights
of action against stockholders who accept dividends which
render a corporation insolvent, etc.
In brief, it is seen that a corporation is a bundle of powers,
conferred upon a given number of individuals, subject to cer-
tain limitations, which limitations are enforced by specified
means.
Powers Granted.
That these powers are in derogation of the common law
appears from the statement of them. The power of succession
or legal immortality is possessed by no individual as such. The
power of limited liability is substantially an exemption of cer-
tain individuals from the ordinary full liability for debts which
is imposed by the common law. The power of representative
government is a material modification of the common-law form
of agency which appears in partnership.
In like manner it will be seen that the other powers peculiar
to corporations are in derogation or in modification of the
ordinary common law. This fact of derogation of common law
is the basis for the peculiar regulative power of the state over
corporations. When individuals are given powers which do not
exist under the common law, it is necessary that in their cor-
porate capacity they should be subject to regulations to a cor-
responding extent in order to prevent the misuse of such powers.
Limitations upon Powers.
Upon the power of representative organization and govern-
ment are imposed the limitations necessary to protect the
ordinary stockholders and to safeguard the rights of the
minority. The general principle of limitation upon this power
is quite analogous to constitutional limitations imposed upon
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the legislative and executive branches of state and federal gov-
ernments. Similarly, the limitations upon the powers of
internal and external management are intended for the safe-
guarding of the rights of stockholders and of third parties
doing business with the corporation in the capacity of cred-
itors, employees and consumers. Similar limitations are also
placed upon the powers of doing business so that a certain
amount of publicity must be maintained for the information of
the state and of third parties.
Enforcement of Limitations.
In order to make these limitations efficient, various
machinery of enforcement is provided, mainly in the nature of
publicity through reports to state officials, and also by placing
certain penalties, either in the nature of criminal penalties or
in the nature of the right of damages in third parties, against
officers and stockholders overstepping such limitations.
The foregoing outline is of course only illustrative of the
features of corporation law. It will be seen that all the fea-
tures above cited are peculiar to corporation law, and to that
extent are not known to the common law. The state creates
corporations and grants to them certain powers, as above
indicated, not within the reach of the individual engaged in
business. These powers are so great and so permanent that
they would be subject to abuse unless restrained, and the state
therefore places limitations upon them and sees that these
limitations are enforced.
The aggregate of legislation under these general principles
is what is known as corporation law.
II. ECONOMIC THEORY OF CORPORATION LAW.
Corporation law, as an economic product, is primarily the
result of concentration of capital. For the purposes of this dis-
cussion it is practically necessary only to consider economic
phenomena of this nature that have appeared in the last fifty
years.
Previous to that period the individual or partnership form of
transacting business was a sufficiently satisfactory instrument
* for carrying on business. The ordinary business of that time
was small in extent, required a comparatively small amount of
capital, and this necessary amount of capital could usually be
furnished by at most three or four men, and all those engaged in
the undertaking could give the business their personal super-
vision.
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But then arose the striking and peculiar series of phe-
nomena that have characterized the economic history of the
country in the latter half of the last century.
The proper development of the business resources of the
country at the opening of this period began to require that very
large enterprises should be undertaken, enterprises involving
millions of money, a considerable period of time for develop-
ment, and the highest business and technical skill available.
Under no other conditions could the necessary work of com-
merce be performed. What is known among economists as the
"minimum unit of efficiency" had greatly increased; in other
words, the minimum amount of capital with which certain kinds
of businesses could be carried on profitably became very much
larger than before.
It thus became apparent that the individual or partnership
form of business would be wholly inadequate. It was, of
course, absurd to contemplate the construction of a transconti-
nental railroad, for instance, or any business of similar magni-
tude, by individuals or by a partnership. There became
apparent the imperative economic need for some form of doing
business by means of which the surplus capital of numerous
individuals might be combined and directed upon a single-
enterprise. The application of this mass of capital must, for
business efficiency, be centered in a few hands. The many
small investors, necessarily thus deprived of personal control
and supervision over the use of their individual contributions,
must in equity also be relieved of personal responsibility for
mismanagement. Safeguards must be provided against the
abuse of the powers concentrated in such few hands so as to
protect both the mass of stockholders, the minority interests,
third parties, and the state. Hence the corporate form, with
its massing of a large number of small units of capital, through
divisibility of its stock interests, its control, vested through a
representative form of government, in a few men constituting
its board of directors, its correlative release of the ordinary
stockholders from personal responsibility, through the medium.
of the legal feature of limited liability, and the necessary limi-
tations imposed upon these powers in favor of stockholders,
creditors and the state.
The obvious appropriateness, availability and economic
necessity of the corporate form became at once apparent with
the development of the commercial and economic phenomena.
above outlined.
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III. BAsic LEGAL FACTORS.
State System of Incorporation.
The "State system" so called, is the most important single
factor in our present corporation law.
The development of this state system could hardly have been
avoided in view of this historical development of the United
States. The earliest local sovereignties in this country were the
colonies or the states. The creation of corporations, being an
act of sovereignty, and in many respects in derogation of the
common law, necessarily lay with these states. Prior to the
adoption of the Federal Constitution, there was no other legal
sovereignty. It may be added, also, that at the time when the
seed of our present corporation system was sown and until the
plan had attained considerable growth, the colonies or states
were not only legal sovereignties, but were also distinct
entities in commerce and finance, and the state boundary lines
had a definite commercial meaning.
Regulation by the States.
Regulation of corporations by the states followed as a neces-
sary corollary from the incorporation by states. The power
which created must also regulate, there being then no other or
superior power to do so.
State Comity.
When one considers, in the light of general principles, the
well-known theory of the comity of states as regards corpora-
tions, this theory assumes the position of a very interesting and
peculiar phenomenon. The substance of this theory is to the
effect that a corporation, chartered in one state, may exist, do
business, sue and be sued in other states, subject to such regu-
lations as such other states may choose to impose. In other
words, while the laws of one state have no effect outside the
territory of that state, nevertheless a corporation of one state,
which is wholly the artificial creature of the laws of that state.
has definite existence, identity, and powers beyond the limits
of the creating state.
So far as is known, the abstract theory at the basis of this
position has not been clearly laid down. It would seem, for
the purposes of state comity, that the corporation laws of one
state are not only recognized, but are, to some extent, tacitly
re~nacted in the laws of the other states. A corporation is
practically an artificial creature of statute law and has no
existence, identity or powers beyond the statute of its crea-
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tion. The statutes of a given state stop at that state's line.
And yet the principle of state comity, as universally applied in
our present corporation system, allows of the existence in one
state of the corporate entities created by another, and the exer-
cise there by them of certain powers. All this without any
express legislative permission on the part of the foreign state;
but as statutory action of some sort is theoretically necessary
to the existence of a corporation, the theory of state comity
must assume a tacit action on the part of the foreign state
which is tantamount to a regnacting of the laws of the incor-
porating state. In practice, of course, a foreign state almost
always adds some few express restrictive requirements on its
own account as to foreign corporations, but, subject to this
qualification, it may be roughly said in theory that the corpora-
tion law operative within any one state of the Union is made
up of one part express statutory law passed by its own legis-
lature, and of forty-four parts implied statutes passed by the
legislatures of other states; in other words, the corporation law
of a given state is an aggregation of all the laws of all the
states, regardless of the' manner in which they may conflict,
vary or modify each other.
So much for the abstract theory at the basis of state comity-
a matter of pure theory, inasmuch as no decision can now be
cited going into the theory of the matter comprehensively and
generally.
As to the practice, state comity is, as said above, more of an
economic necessity than a legal theory. In practice, it may be
roughly said that it amounts to an extra-constitutional federa-
tion of the states on the single point of corporations as citizens.
The Corporation as Such.
For the legal theory of the corporation we are indebted
largely to the Roman law, which, with the strict logic of that
law, laid stress upon the wholly artificial nature of the cor-
porate entity regardless of the natural individuals composing its
membership. This tendency in the treatment of the corpora-
tion was naturally predominant at the time when our corporate
system was formed, at which time the corporation was more
important as a theory than as a fact. Oux courts accordingly
developed the corporation on theoretical lines. Logic demanded
that the relation of the individual stockholder to the corpora-
tion, and as a part of the corporation, be minimized, and the
result was that when, in the latter half of the last century,
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the economic forces began to operate upon our corporate system,
the corporation known to our law was a highly artificial entity.
IV. RECENT FORCED GROWTH OF CORPORATION LAW.
In the latter half of the last century the corporation sud-
denly leaped from the position of a legal phenomenon to that
of an economic necessity, urged by the forces of commercial
development above indicated. When this great economic
change took place, it found the framework of a corporation
system already prepared, having, as above stated, certain pre-
dominant features:
(a) The development of the corporation as a strictly arti-
ficial legal phenomenon.
(b) The practically exclusive control of corporate creation
by the states under the state system.
(c) Regulation of corporations by the states.
(d) State comity, and the peculiar relations dependent
thereon.
Then came the swift progress of the country towards mater-
ial prosperity, the accumulation in the hands of many individ-
uals of small surpluses of capital, the development of great
enterprises, the increase of the minimum '.unit of efficiency"
in given businesses, and the accompanying concentration of
capital in a few hands.
To meet these conditions the legal form of doing business
known as the corporation was required, and into the old arti-
ficial framework of corporation law already constructed was
turned the rush of these great economic forces, and the over-
predominance of legal theory gave way to a corresponding over-
predominance of practical necessity, until our present corpora-
tion system, in its distorted and disproportionate outline, shows
the effect of these forces, as a geological formation shows the
effect of overwhelming forces of disturbances.
With these forces pressing upon the legislatures, the modern
history of our corporate system opens. The results reflect the
motive forces. Regardless of theory or consistency or perma-
nence, or the proper and proportionate protection of the
interests involved, legislation yielded to the new pressures, and
a structure was built up which is a marvel and a monument of
opportunist make-shift.
At first, it is true, the states held back, retaining the old
notion . of the semi-sacredness of the corporate franchise as a
special privilege and grant of sovereignty. Then the comity of
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the states began its logical work- the more accommodating
states got the larger share of the revenue-bringing incorpora-
tion. The conservative states gained only empty credit for
their caution, and their own citizens journeyed to other states
for easy incorporation, and returned home a foreign corpora-
tion, paying taxes and owing allegiance elsewhere, but, through
the comity of states, doing business freely in the practically
helpless conservative state.
Then as the century closed, the use of the corporation as a
mere stock-jobbing tool became suddenly important. This
process is as yet only partially complete, but what the final
product will be under existing conditions is obvious now.
What does it avail that forty-four states have good corporation
laws, if the forty-fifth, through the principle of comity, can
offer a lax law, and practically thereby nullify the virtuous
aims of the others, and in addition, be rewarded for such
laxness by an inrush of remunerative incorporation? How
long will the more conservative states stand up against the
logic of such circumstances, when such conservatism hurts
them, and does no one else good? The making of corporation
laws must degenerate, as it already largely has, into a bidding
of state against state for corporate patronage through increased
grants of power and decreased regulation. The final result
under the present system, if carried to its logical and inevitable
conclusion, will be a reduction of all our corporation law to the
lowest level of laxity, and the disproportionate favoring of the
strictly "promoting" interests, the original organizers, as against
the other interests properly concerned in corporation law, to wit,
stockholders, creditors, consumers and the state. And it must
always be remembered that those who "promote," or organize
a corporation have no necessary interest in its permanent
success as a business machine. They are frequently concerned
only in the "flotation" of its securities.
V. ACTUAL STATUTORY RESULT.
A comparison with the various corporation laws of the states
in force to-day will illustrate what has already beeni said. It is
not necessary to make a complete summary of all the state laws
for this purpose, nor would it be justifiable to do so within the
limits of this article. It is sufficient for illustration to take
certain powers or certain limitations thereon in states selected
at random and compare them, and with this in view, it is to
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be remembered that the following statements are not intended
to be comprehensive, but merely by way of illustration, and
taken from varying numbers of states selected wholly at
random.
Take, for example, the power of corporate succession, to
wit, the duration of the existence of corporations. Out of seven
states so selected, five allow perpetual existence unless other-
wise specified; one limits the duration of such existence to fifty
years, and one to twenty years.
Minimum number of incorporators. Out of five states, three
states require at least four, and two at least five.
As to the very important power of making by-laws, four
states out of eight allow the stockholders to confer this power
upon the directors; one confers it directly upon the directors,
and the rest leave it in the hands of the stockholders only.
Scope of by-laws. The powers granted in this direction vary
from "any by-laws not inconsistent with law," to a detailed
and specified statement covering half a printed page, very few
corporation laws being alike on this point.
Place of meeting. No uniformity is observable here, some
states allowing meetings of directors or stockholders to be held
in or out of the state, some restricting stockholders to meet-
ings in the state and others making various combinations of
these two factors.
Voting. By way of exception to emphasize the general rule
of diversity, nearly all the states forbid a corporation to vote
its own stock. Various provisions are made allowing bond-
holders in certain cases to vote.
Number of directors. In seven states, four require three or
more; one, five or more; one, three to eleven; and one, three
to fifteen. Some of these states require that a majority of
these shall be resident; others require only one resident, and
three out of seven have no requirement as to residence.
Executive committee. This very important feature is allowed
in three states out of seven, and in the other four states is not
provided for.
Character of business. This power varies in the restrictions
placed upon it. Most states allow "any lawful business
except' '-and these exceptions are varied in proportion to the
number of states.
Amount of capital. In a number of selected states, the mini-
mum varies from zero to $2,ooo, and the maximum from
$250,000 upward indefinitely.
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Consideration for stock subscriptions. This important question
is treated in a great variety of ways. It is impossible to specify
or classify satisfactorily the provisions on this subject, some
states allowing substantially anything with no restrictions as to
value, other states requiring that stock should be paid for in
cash or property, with a certain amount in cash, and others
allowing cash, property or services at actual valuation.
Enough has been said, it is believed, to indicate the diversity
of legal conditions now existing. It is to be remembered that
the number of variations presented above in legal conditions is
to be multiplied many times, as previously indicated, by the
addition of the feature of state comity, and it is to be further
noted that this feature of state comity adds the further peculiar
legal condition that any corporation doing business in a foreign
state under the theory of state comity is transacting business
as a foreign corporation, with the peculiar legal conditions that
attach to this relationship.
To finally cap the pyramid of diversity, additional varying
statutory conditions are placed by such foreign states on the
right of corporations of other states to do business therein.
It will be seen from the above that no attempt in this con-
nection has been made to make a complete summary of the
legal conditions under which corporations are now doing
business. Obviously, no such attempt can properly be made
within the limits of this magazine. It is merely desired to
demonstrate, as forcibly as may be, the extreme diversity and
complexity of the legal corporate relations that have arisen
through the development of the "State system," based upon a
theoretic rather than a practical view of a corporate entity, and
made commercially available through the doctrine of state
comity. The basic reasons for this state of affairs have already
been outlined. It is probable that the so-called "State system,"
to wit, the incorporation by states, is the most important
feature contributing to this situation. Given that feature, and
the results above noted are almost inevitable. Under the
state system, the theory of the comity of states was an economic
necessity, and given forty-five state legislatures, annually or
biennially creating or -revising their respective corporation
laws, each influenced by the local habit of thought and local
prejudices, and each having in mind local conditions and
interests, it is obvious that no 'better or more complete means
could have been devised for creating a legal mosaic of the
highest diversity and complexity.
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VI. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL RESULTS OF THE SYSTEM.
It may perhaps be fairly said that this corporation system
can be best comprehended by regarding it as an imperfect
attempt to attain, under great restrictions, and in the face of
great difficulties, a crude federal system for corporate business.
And if corporations were as unimportant as they were a
hundred years ago, this system would be an extremely interest-
ing legal phenomenon, but would have no vital bearing on the
industry of to-day. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The
vast majority of business is now carried on under the corporate
form. Probably the vast majority of our population stands in
close relation to corporate business. The paramount problems
of the present and of the future are those of industry. These
are the problems which engage the ablest men of the present.
No consideration of our present commercial system would be
in any way complete if it did not take into account the singular
legal conditions under which it is being carried on.
As to Corporatons Themselves.
Since the earliest historic times, our race has been engaged
in a continuous struggle to establish the liberty of the individ-
ual, and the one continuous method for this end, and the one
toward which our struggles have been consciously or uncon-
.sciously directed, has been the defining, with ever-increasing
clearness, of the outlines and boundaries of this liberty, until
to-day a citizen knows, with reasonable certainty, his personal
rights, duties and privileges.
But in the last fifty years there have come into existence a
large number of artificial entities-i e., corporations-which, by
virtue of their character, have no inherent or original rights or
duties. Their status depends substantially upon statute. The
welfare of the country and the welfare of the vast majority of
the citizens of the country are intimately connected with these
artificial entities. Uncertainty as to their rights, privileges and
duties is uncertainty as to the essential things that go to make
up the happiness of the individual citizen, and yet uncertainty
is the one overshadowing fact that can be predicated of the
status of the corporation of to-day. It is hardly necessary to
develop this idea further or to go into the details of the present
diversity and practical anarchy that prevails as to corporate
relations. The foregoing statements of general principles are
sufficient to indicate the peculiar foundation upon which our
industrial system largely rests.
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As to the Public.
The public stands toward the corporation in the diverse rela-
tions of creditor, stockholder, consumer and voter. The legal
uncertainty above mentioned permeates all these relations,
and in the most important one, to wit, that of the voter, the
evil effects of this uncertainty are great. Public opinion is the
strongest single force in the United States. It is slow of
growth; it is the basis of all our law; our law is merely a
crystallization of public opinion; and recognizing its impor-
tance, it has been the uniform policy of the country so to educate
the people that this public opinion shall be in the end correct.
If it is not, our political system must fail.
No means could be better adopted to prevent the growth of
an intelligent public opinion on the industrial issues of to-day
than our present corporation system. How can the average
citizen, the unit of public opinion, gain the most rudimentary
basis for intelligent views on the present forms of industry?
When forty-five different jurisdictions are continually creating
or modifying as many forms of corporation law, when a dual
system of courts, federal and state, is differing in construc-
tion of these laws, when no trained lawyer will undertake
to give an opinion as to the fundamentals of the corporation
law outside his own state without prolonged examination of the
most recent statutes, how can the average citizen act or think
intelligently or justly in this matter?
The ignorance of the many has always been the profit of
the few. In the relations of stockholders, creditors and con-
sumers, our present system has been abused by men who have
made a specialty of such abuse. The system is a standing invi-
tation to such abuse, and the invitation has been widely
accepted. The results have been the defrauding of the
ignorant public as stockholders and as creditors, the lowering
of the tone of public standards of integrity, and the degradation
of certain great classes of American securities in the markets
of the world.
As to the States.
Corollary to the above, have been the results on the states
themselves. The great economic forces being thus obliged to
deal with state legislatures, and having before them this invi-
tation of uncertainty and diversity, have brought about political
effects and established political standards that are inconsistent
with the ideals upon which our country was founded. The
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present large corporation is commercially a national affair.
Commercially, it knows nothing of state lines, and it operates
without regard to them. Legally, it is the creature of one
state. In all other states it is a foreign corporation. Doing
business throughout the nation, it is doing it-under conditions
imposed by single comparatively small parts of the nation, and
when the two forces meet, to wit, the corporation that desires
grants of power and the legislature that should withhold, the
forces are unevenly balanced and the contest is unequal.
Briefly, the legal conditions of our business systems do not
correspond to the commercial conditions. National businesses
are being carried on under state forms.
VII. VIEWED AS EXPERIMENTS.
It can at least be said for our present system of incorpora-
tion that it gives room for experiment. Probably nearly every
conceivable form or modification of corporation law has at one
time or other been enacted by the states. This of itself is of
course an advantage from a strictly scientific standpoint, how-
ever unfortunate may be the results commercially. Probably
a comparative study of the corporation laws of the states would
be one of the most instructive aids to the formulation of a satis-
factory system. This study would show not only the different
features of the laws themselves, but also their respective
merits, their respective enforceability, and the varied forces
working upon the legislatures through which these laws are
introduced. It is believed that if there is to be any uniform
and rational system of corporation law established in the
United States, either by federal incorporation or the federal
license plan, as suggested in the recent report of the Commis-
sioner of Corporations, an important part of the work will be
done when a thorough comparative study has been made of the
corporation laws of the various states, with the varying legal
efficiency thereof, the diverse effects upon business and the
relations of the states as law-making powers to such systems
of law.
Herbert Knox Smith.
